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Abstract System OEMs are increasingly adopting the
motto “Trust but verify” when it comes to their supply
chains. After several public incidents in which trusted ven-
dors unknowingly provided vulnerable components, OEMs
are requesting evidence of security assurance before inte-
grating components into their products. It can be problem-
atic for semiconductor vendors to provide such evidence
since their products often contain 3rd party components
that are typically treated as black boxes. Moreover, ask-
ing 3rd party vendors to provide such evidence for their
components is equally problematic due to the many inte-
gration unknowns and a lack of applicable literature on
security assurance for standalone technologies. We address
these issues by defining a security process and relationship
between semiconductor vendors and trusted 3rd party com-
ponent providers and a practical methodology to produce
standardized quality security assurance evidence. We pro-
vide example applications of the methodology using several
open source components.
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1 Introduction
There have been several incidents in which system OEMs
have suffered costly security vulnerabilities due to 3rd party
components [1–4]. As far as we are aware, all were caused
by software components, making the mitigation of these
vulnerabilities relatively simple (e.g., patch, disablement,
or removal). However, mitigating a similar problem aris-
ing from insecure hardware would require an expensive
recall. To help manage security risk, OEMs are requesting
hardware vendors to provide evidence of security assur-
ance to increase confidence in a component’s quality. In
general, semiconductor vendors will be able to accommo-
date these requests, since they know the data flows, use
cases, interdependencies, etc. of their silicon, all of which
are needed to perform security assessments using existing
methodologies [5–8]. However, if the vendor has integrated
3rd Party Intellectual Property (3PIP, IP), their knowledge
alone would typically not be sufficient to produce quality
security assurance evidence. Most semiconductor vendors
view 3PIP as black box technology that hooks into their
silicon and “just works.” Furthermore, 3PIP is often pro-
vided only as a netlist, which limits what security evaluation
a semiconductor vendor (now functioning as an Integra-
tor) can perform. An Integrator can perform security design
checking [18] and/or formal verification; however, these
can be time consuming and still not address all integra-
tion security concerns. Therefore, Integrators depend on
trusted IP providers to produce security assurance collateral
for their technologies. However, existing security assurance
methodologies require system level information in order to
complete. Unfortunately, this information is rarely available
to IP providers, mainly because 3PIP is designed, devel-
oped, and productized well before Integrators define their
product requirements. It is not uncommon for Commercial
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Off-the-Shelf (COTS) IP to be developed several years
before product integration. We address this dilemma by
defining an industry security assurance process at the IP
level, the types of collateral information to be produced,
and how to produce this collateral information. We also pro-
vide examples of how this process can be applied to some
selected open source IPs.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as
follows:
• Definition of a process between an end-product Inte-
grator and a trusted IP vendor to capture and use
standardized security assurance collateral to communi-
cate potential security concerns related to integration of
IP. Over time, the process can be used to assess the com-
petence of an IP vendor for establishing or increasing
trust.
• Creation of a practical methodology, focused on COTS
IP integration, to produce quality security assurance
evidence which includes (1) a security risk assess-
ment that identifies today’s known integration security
concerns, along with actions and recommendations to
reduce risk and (2) a light-weight IP integration threat
model.
• Formulation of a common language between COTS
IP providers and Integrators to communicate poten-
tial security concerns in IP integration. This common
language makes it efficient and cost-effective for IP
providers to support multiple customers and recognizes
the need of integrators who work with multiple IP
providers to be able to provide security assurance for
their products to system OEMs.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines
the overall process between an IP provider and Integrator.
Section 3 describes the methodology and types of collateral
needed for usable security assurance evidence. Section 4
shows how the threat modeling methodology can be applied
using open source cores as examples. We lay out our Con-
clusion in Section 5 and provide an Appendix A with figures
detailing the methodology outlined in Section 3.
2 Overall Process Flow
The IP security assurance process flow between an end-
product Integrator and a trusted IP provider is shown in
Fig. 1. It is based on both parties sharing the goal of produc-
ing high-quality secure products, which are common in the
semiconductor industry (i.e., integrators do not engage non-
reputable or untrusted vendors). Additionally, the collateral
produced should not be considered a replacement for formal
verification or similar practices[18]. The process focuses
on COTS products and not co-designed or co-developed IP.
The process also aligns with architecture and design require-
ments in a typical Security Development Life Cycle (SDL)
process [6]. Lastly, Fig. 1 depicts a minimal flow that may
be expanded to accommodate custom engagements and/or
other stages of the SDL process.
The dashed rectangle on the left labeled “Assessment”
encloses collateral that is expected for all COTS IP a vendor
produces. Note that the IP for which collateral is provided
does not necessarily have explicit security objectives or
claims; thus, the process is designed to accommodate IP
providers that are experts in their functional areas, but do not
necessarily have security expertise. Due to the potentially
sensitive nature of the collateral, IP providers may choose
to protect it with a confidentiality agreement, but it may
also be provided freely under the general IP license. The
Integrator reviews the collateral to understand any security
concerns identified (and those areas of concern that might
Fig. 1 IP security assurance process flow
J Hardw Syst Secur
not have been identified) and the conditions under which
the IP can be properly integrated into the product. Based on
this review, the Integrator may decide to (1) not to use the
IP and possibly engage with another vendor or (2) accept
the IP and integrate or (3) request a threat model for further
evaluation. The conditions for each outcome are Integrator
and application specific and out of scope of this process.
The request for threat modeling collateral is enclosed by
the dashed rectangle on the right labeled “Evaluation.” The
threat model should highlight security concerns that an Inte-
grator needs to be aware of, and Integrators must decide
which concerns are relevant to their product. In most cases,
the process will stop here, meaning security concerns have
been addressed. When there are particular concerns with
some threats, the Integrator may wish to conduct a security
design review with the IP vendor. This is a joint review in
which the IP vendor and Integrator examine the IP design
in greater detail, in particular the implementation of mitiga-
tions for one or more threats. Since this kind of review is
usually quite specific to the IP and operational domain, this
process is also out of scope for this paper. The important
point is that the process that identified a concern stems from
the methodology that is the subject here. The remainder of
this paper focuses on the details of the green boxes in Fig. 1.
3 Methodology
This section details what security assurance an IP provider
should produce in order to address the Integrator’s secu-
rity concerns. There are two main components (though
there may be others as well): (1) Security Risk Assessment
and ensuing Integration Guidance and (2) Architectural and
Design Threat Model.
3.1 Security Risk Assessment
The goal of this activity is to perform a Security Risk
Assessment (SRA) on the architecture and design of the
IP. The SRA consists of a list of questions that will help
identify today’s known security concerns [8]. There are cur-
rently 18 topics such as debug access, test modes, and access
protections; however, the list may grow as new areas of con-
cern are identified. The SRA expands on [8] by providing
practical guidance that lists concerns, actions, and/or recom-
mendations on which an Integrator may act. Each question
is designed to have either a follow-on question to drill down
further or provide actionable guidance to address the con-
cern. The associated concern is the reason why the question
is being asked. For example, a question about debug regis-
ters is concerning because often these registers can be used
maliciously (e.g., to bypass existing protections or allow
unrestricted assess to an asset). Often, an action will be





The SRA is intended to address security concerns at both
the IP and integration level. To differentiate between these
two levels, the terms native and external are used. Native
refers to concerns that arise within the IP itself, while
external refers to anything outside it
Security
review
For the purpose of this document, a security review refers
to, at a minimum, a threat model which is defined in
Section 3.2. However, additional collateral such as valida-
tion and/or verification tests, code review results can be
included for completeness
identified for the IP provider to complete. All actions should
be completed before an Integrator considers using the IP in a
product. In the debug register example, one action would be
to label these registers with a DEBUG tag in the Integration
Guide so to get the proper attention. Lastly, a recommen-
dation may be provided for the Integrator to consider. In
the same example, a recommendation would be to restrict
access to these debug registers by implementing access con-
trol protections at the integration layer. Table 1 defines a few
terms that are useful in understanding the SRA. Appendix A
provides full details of each question and its path flows,
starting with Fig. 8. To close, it is worth emphasizing that
SRA results should not be used to represent overall risk of
an IP since this can often lead to a false sense of security, as
proven in [8].
3.2 IP Threat Model
After reviewing the results of the SRA, an Integrator may
request the IP vendor to provide a threat model. This will
typically occur when there is assertion of a concern listed in
the SRA. The goal of the threat model is to elucidate secu-
rity threats and concerns to which the IP may be exposed in
order to provide guidance to the integrator. The threat model
attributes are shown in Table 2 and are focused around a
functional asset-based approach [9]. The benefits of this
Table 2 IP threat model attributes
Attribute Definition
Asset Anything of value or importance that is crucial
to proper behavior. Assets are typically contained
within the IP
Access point Any means by which an adversary can gain access
to an asset
Threat Anything that can potentially alter or compromise
the behavior of an asset
Concern The potential harm that a threat poses to an asset
Mitigation An action or countermeasure put in place to reduce
the severity of a threat
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Fig. 2 Asset-centric approach
approach are (1) it is straightforward and easy to implement
by non-security individuals and (2) functional behaviors
often persist in integration regardless of system complex-
ity whereas vulnerabilities found by other approaches may
not. The attributes in Table 2 should be completed for each
identified {threat, asset} pair.
As shown in Fig. 2, we recommend an inside-out
approach as follows:
1. Identify the assets
2. Identify the access points to the assets
3. Identify the threats that are exposed by the access points
and list the concerns and mitigations associated to each
threat
The process is complete once all the access points for
each asset have been examined for threats and the results
have been documented. The following sections provide
more details on each step.
3.2.1 Asset Identification
Probably, one of the more difficult steps in IP threat mod-
eling is identifying the assets. This step by nature is subject
to ambiguity. The reason is because many consider either
“everything” or “nothing” in an IP as an asset. This mindset
of all or nothing can often lead to an incorrect or unus-
able threat model (i.e., too many false positives). To help
minimize the confusion, focus on functional objectives and
claims of the IP instead of a particular security concern(s).
Addressing security concerns will be part of step 3 in the
methodology. To find the functional objectives, answer the
question “What exactly is the functional purpose of the IP?”
Next, answer “What minimal components are required to
achieve it’s functional purpose?” This exercise will help
resolve what the true assets in the IP are.
3.2.2 Access Points Identification
Once an asset has been identified, finding its access points
is fairly straightforward. Access points can be either directly
or indirectly connected. The question to address is what
interfaces (e.g., signal, pin, bus, register) can be used to gain
access to (i.e., alter or compromise the behavior of) an asset.
Often access points can be referred to as vulnerabilities.
A subtle point about access points is that the complete set
may not be immediately obvious to the IP provider. Many
IP providers supply their product as RTL source code or
netlist. As part of the integration process, new access points
are created via scan insertion and other processes that are
designed to enhance manufacturing, testability, etc. Some
assets may become visible by leakage through side chan-
nels such as power or electromagnetic emanation signatures.
While these access points are primarily of concern to secu-
rity IP providers (who should be aware of them), they might
provide access to any asset. Complete identification by the
IP provider of assets will enable the integrator to determine
any threats associated with these.
3.2.3 Threats, Concerns, and Mitigations
The last step in the process is to identify any threats and
associated concerns and, if possible, provide a potential mit-
igation. Once a threat is identified, at least one concern must
be associated with it. This concern will highlight what is at
risk to the asset due to the threat. This information is crit-
ical to the Integrator since it will determine which threats
will be in scope for the product. Not all threats may be in
scope once the IP is integrated, as we explain in more detail
later in this section. Any threats that are mitigated should be
noted as such. If the IP itself does not include a mitigation,
a recommendation can be provided for how to mitigate the
threat in integration.
It is not a requirement that the IP provider implement
mitigations to all identified threats. This is because, as noted
above, not all threats may be in scope for a product, or
the mitigation may be better implemented at the integration
level. Unless the threat is associated to a specific objec-
tive or claim that the IP promotes, mitigations should be an
activity for the Integrator to implement. The main motiva-
tion for this approach is help the IP provider keep logic,
footprint, power, and cost to a minimum.
There are several situations in which including a mitiga-
tion within an IP can lead to unnecessary effort. Such an
example might be an IP that supports multiple bus inter-
faces, each with its own set of potential threats that are
mitigated by additional logic. However, the Integrator only
plans to use one of those buses, leaving the rest uncon-
nected. In this case, the IP provider expended unnecessary
effort and added unnecessary logic to mitigate threats that
are not in scope for the product. In a different vein, some-
times a single mitigation implemented at the integration
level can thwart a threat across multiple IPs. Suppose that
a particular malformed packet impacts several IPs on a
peripheral bus. Instead of each IP blocking this packet, a
better mitigation would be to prevent it from making it onto
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the bus altogether, which is an integration activity. Lastly,
product constraints may render IP-level mitigations ineffec-
tive. Suppose bit 31 of a configuration register serves as a
lock to prohibit write access to a register range. However, if
the integrating product only supports a 16-bit single-access
data bus, then this lock mitigation would be unreachable. Of
course one could argue that the real problem is that this IP
should not be integrated into this type of product. Neverthe-
less, the reality is that COTS IP providers have no control
over how an IP is integrated into a product.
To help guide whether a mitigation should be imple-
mented within the IP, consider these following questions: (1)
Can the mitigation be implemented ONLY in the IP? (2) Is
the threat in scope for typical implementations AND is the
mitigation BEST implemented in the IP? If either answer
is yes, the IP should include the mitigation; otherwise, it
should be noted and left for the Integrator.
3.2.4 Threat Analysis Omission
For products in which system and data flows are under-
stood from end to end, a threat analysis is typically expected
for each threat identified. Methods such as STRIDE and
DREAD [10] are used to understand the risk and severity of
threats. This activity may be almost impossible to perform
for COTS IP since such product flows are unknown during
the time of development. Therefore, it is recommended that
the threat analysis be performed by the Integrator, not the IP
provider.
3.3 Complete Walk-Through Examples
This section illustrates the complete process described in
Fig. 1 by walking through the design of two open core
examples: (1) RC4 crypto core and (2) Watchdog timer. The
cores were selected to highlight the complete methodology
because the implementations are simple, publicly available
in source RTL and well documented, the security claims
made are transparent so as not to overshadow the process,
and the collateral produced is minimal, making it easier to
comprehend.
Fig. 3 RC4 core
Table 3 RC4 SRA results
Question Answer Comments
Q1–Q3 No –
Q4: Save/restore No If power is lost in the middle of
a key generation, the key is dis-
carded. Once the key is created,
the Integrator is responsible for
saving and restoring it as needed
Q5: Random numbers No For proper RC4 operation, the
password input should be unique
per stream
Q6: Integrity checking No –
Q7: Cryptography Yes The core generates a keystream
for encryption/decryption




Q17: Security claims No Already addressed in Question #7
Q18: Unknowns No All addressed in the threat model
3.3.1 Example I: RC4 Core Architecture
Figure 3 is the block diagram of the RC4 core, which is
a pseudo-random stream generator [11]. The IP generates
an RC4 stream which can be XOR’ed with data to provide
confidentiality. Although the RC4 algorithm has been dep-
recated and deemed insecure, the implementation provides
a good example for applying the process to identify security
concerns in IP integration.
The core contains a five-stage finite state machine (FSM)
that maps to the RC4 algorithm [12]. The basic operational
flow is as follows:
1. When rst is low, the core will start sampling the pass-
word on password input, one byte per clk cycle, until
KEY SIZE is reached. (In our example, KEY SIZE is
hardcoded to 0x7.)
2. The FSM performs the key expansion and discards the
weak bytes in the stream as defined in RFC 4345.1
3. Once the FSM reaches the Crypto state and all
the weak bytes have been discarded, output ready is
asserted to signify that the data on k is now valid. The
user reads the keystream (k), byte-by-byte as needed to
encrypt (or decrypt) a message.
3.3.2 Security Risk Assessment
Table 3 shows the answers to the SRA questions for the RC4
core. The only triggers (i.e., “Yes” answers) pertain to the
1https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4345.txt
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security concerns involving cryptography. Therefore, due to
these triggers, the expectation is for the Integrator to request
a threat model from the IP provider.
3.3.3 Threat Model
The first step is to identify the IP’s functional assets. The
purpose of this core is to generate an RC4 keystream. Once
taken out of reset, the FSM will generate keystream bytes
as long as an external clock is applied and output ready is
asserted. Since output ready notifies when a valid key is
available, which is controlled by the Crypto stage, this
stage is the asset. It must be protected from inputs that could
cause unwanted behavior (i.e., an invalid key). The next
step is to identify the access points to the Crypto state.
Looking at the block diagram in Fig. 3, the input signals
on the left-side of the diagram make up the attack surface.
Table 4 is a list of threats that could cause concerns to an
Integrator.
Table 4 Threat model for RC4 core
# Attribute Definition
1 Asset Crypto stage
Access point password input
Threat Weak or repeated input will cause a predictable
output stream
Concern A predictable output stream does not provide ade-
quate confidentiality protection
Mitigation None. Recommendations:
• Integrator to ensure data on password input
is never repeated
• Increase the KEY SIZE defined in the HDL
to provide more entropy
2 Asset Crypto stage
Access point clk, rst
Threat Manipulate the access points to inject a fault to
bypass a state in the FSM [19]
Concern The FSM will be in an unwanted or unknown state
Mitigation None. This is a sophisticated attack that might be
out of scope for an end product. Recommendation:
The FSM states are defined by a 4-bit register with
only 5 being assigned. In RTL, assigned the 11
undefined states to fail safely/securely
3 Asset Crypto stage
Access point None
Threat As defined by RFC 4345, the first 1536 bytes of
the output keystream are considered weak
Concern If the first 1536 bytes are used, the output stream
will not provide adequate confidentiality protec-
tion
Mitigation The FSM discards the first 1536 bytes before
output ready is asserted
Fig. 4 Watchdog timer2
3.3.4 RC4 Conclusion
In summary, the RC4 IP core implementation has relatively
low risk due to its limited attack surface and simple design.
Other than the insecurity of the RC4 algorithm itself, the
IP design has minimal threats. However, there are some
things to be considered when integrating to help reduce
risk. This becomes apparent in the results of the SRA and
threat model. The collateral, which clearly calls out security
concerns to address during integration, can be used by the
Integrator to improve the quality of their product.
3.3.5 Example II: Watchdog Timer
Figure 4 shows a block diagram for a watchdog timer named
Computer Operating Properly (COP) [13]. There is aWatch-
dog counter component which is configured by three regis-
ters that are accessed through a standardized WISHBONE
interface. When this counter expires, cop rst o asserts. The
normal operation flow is as follows:
1. Disable the COP by clearing enable bit in the control
register (CNTRL.EN).
2. Set the timeout value in the timeout register (TOUT).
3. Enable COP by setting CNTRL.EN. The counter starts
decrementing.
4. (optional) Set the configuration protection locks in
CNTRL. Once locked, CNTRL settings can not be
altered except by reset.
5) Restart the counter by writing 0x5555 and 0xAAAA, in
order, to the count register (CNT)
The COP also supports a few non-standard input signals,
which are not shown in the diagram. These signals are used
for debugging and are listed in Table 5.
2http://opencores.org/websvn,filedetails?repname=cop&path=%2Fcop
%2Fdoc%2FCOP specs.pdf
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Table 5 COP non-standard signals
Signal Description
stop mode i System is in STOP mode
wait mode i System is in WAIT mode
debug mode i System is in DEBUG mode
por rst i Power-on reset
arst i Asynchronous reset
3.3.6 Security Risk Assessment
Table 6 shows the answers to the SRA questions for the COP
core. The tool identified concerns around the non-standard
debug signals. Therefore to help the Integrator better under-
stand these concerns, a threat model should be requested
from the IP provider.
3.3.7 Threat Model
The functional purpose of this IP is to force a system
to a known good state when the watchdog timer expires
(i.e., cop rst o asserts). The core of this functionality is
the Watchdog Counter component, and this counter is the
asset. In addition to the counter, there is an external clock
dependency (startup osc i), which is critical for operation.
However, since this is external to the IP, it will be consid-
ered as a dependency instead of an asset. The access points
Table 6 COP SRA results
Question Answer Comments
Q1: Debug Yes No registers, however, there are
debug signals that can interrupt the
flow of operation
Q1.1 No No access protection mechanisms on
these debug signals
Q2–Q3 No –
Q4: Save/restore No Typical use-case is to have the COP
lose state on a power state change. If
COP state is required to be restored,
the Integrator must provide this func-
tionality
Q5–Q7 No –
Q8: Access protection Yes There are two protection bits to lock
the configuration
Q8.1 Yes Bits 0 & 1 in register CNTRL
Q8.1.1 No No dependencies
Q9-Q12 No –
Q13: Non-standard Yes There are several non-standard sig-
nals that can interrupt normal opera-
tional flow, Table 5
Q14–Q18 No –
to the counter are the WISHBONE interface and the non-
standard input signals. Shown in Table 7 is a list of threats
that may be of concern to an Integrator.
Table 7 Threat model for COP
# Attribute Definition
1 Asset Watchdog Counter
Access point stop mode i, wait mode i, debug mode i,
por rst i, arst i
Threat If the mode is enabled and the corre-
sponding signal is asserted, the Watchdog
Counter will stop decrementing
Concern The watchdog timer will never expire, dis-
abling the COP’s ability to reset a system
Mitigation None. Recommendation: At the integra-
tion layer, access protection mechanisms
should be provided for these non-standard
signals to ensure only trusted agents have
access
2 Asset Watchdog Counter
Access point CNTRL register (WISHBONE interface)
Threat Before the protection locks are set, an
attacker can change the configuration
settings (i.e. mode settings and timeout
value) to prolong the Watchdog Counter
expiration or prevent it from decrement-
ing
Concern The timer will never expire thus disabling
the watchdog’s ability to reset a system
Mitigation All bit settings in the CNTRL register
must be set at the same time by issuing a
single write
3 Asset Watchdog Counter
Access point TOUT register (WISHBONE interface)
Threat Before the CNTRL.EN bit is set, an
attacker can change the timeout value in
TOUT to prolong the Watchdog Counter
expiration
Concern The timer value can be set to the maxi-
mum value which delays when the watch-
dog can reset the system
Mitigation None. Recommendation: At the integra-
tion layer, access protection mechanisms
should be provided for the TOUT register
to ensure only trusted agents have access
4 Asset Watchdog Counter
Access point CNT register (WISHBONE interface)
Threat The values used to reset the Watchdog
Counter can be easily guessed
Concern Once the reset values are known, an
attacker can reset the counter before it
expires, thus preventing the watchdog
from resetting the system
Mitigation None. Recommendation: Provide access
control protections on the CNT register so
only a trusted agent can reset the counter
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Fig. 5 I2C master controller3
3.3.8 Watchdog Conclusion
The threats identified are not caused by unexpected behav-
ior, meaning the COP functions as architected and designed.
However, these behaviors may be undesirable once inte-
grated into a product, especially those of the non-standard
signals. By documenting, it informs the Integrator about
potential risks that could affect the security robustness of
their product.
3.4 Threat Modeling Summary
The threat modeling methodology described in this paper
diverges from traditional approaches such as [17] because
at the level of a standalone IP, full product data flows, use
cases, etc. are unknowns. To overcome this, the method-
ology eliminates threat analysis and instead focuses on
functional threats. As shown in the examples above, often
expected IP behavior can yield unwanted results in an end
product. Without this methodology, it is unclear how such
risks would be identified for an Integrator to take into
consideration. To help highlight the benefits of the method-
ology, additional examples are provided in Section 4.
4 Threat Modeling Examples
This section walks through the architecture and design
threat model process for some additional open source IP
designs to further highlight how the methodology can be
applied. These examples are intended to explain how to
apply the process, since it differs from existing literature,
and should not be considered absolute or comprehensive.




4.1 I2C Master Controller
Figure 5 shows the block diagram of the I2C master con-
troller IP [14]. A WISHBONE interface exposes configura-
tion and data registers. Since I2C is a serial bus, there are
two shift controllers, one for data and one for commands.
Lastly, the block contains a clock generator and an I2C
signal controller.
4.1.1 I2C Master Controller - Threat Model
The functional purpose of this IP is to provide an I2C master
interface on the WISHBONE bus. It is basically a pass-
through which serializes byte data. This is the job of the
Table 8 Threat model for I2C master controller
# Attribute Definition
1 Asset Bit Command Controller, Clock Generator
Access point PRER - Clock prescale register (WISHBONE)
Threat Setting this register will change the frequency
of the I2C clock
Concern Changing the PRER value while the controller
is enabled (i.e., CTR.EN = 1) will cause
transmission errors
Mitigation None. Recommendation: Integration protec-
tions should be provided to prevent the PRER
register from changing values once the con-
troller is enabled
2 Asset Bit Command Controller
Access point CTR.bit7 register (WISHBONE interface)
Threat In the middle of a data transfer on the I2C,
clear the enable bit (“EN”) in the controller
register (CTR)
Concern Toggling the “EN” bit can cause stalls and/or
data loss on the I2C bus
Mitigation None. Recommendation: Integration protec-
tions should be provided to prevent toggling
this bit when data is being transferred
J Hardw Syst Secur
Fig. 6 SPI master controller
Bit Command Controller component, along with the Clock
Generator. Since these components are critical for proper
operation, they are the assets of the IP. The WISHBONE
interface is used to access them. Table 8 is a threat model for
the I2C controller. Again, the identified threats fall within
Table 9 Threat model for SPI master controller
# Attribute Definition
1 Asset SPI interface controller
Access point Control register (SPI CLK DEL REG)
Threat During step#5 of the write operation,
modify the SPI clock delay
Concern Modifying the SPI clock frequency
could cause data corruption on some
SD cards
Mitigation None. Recommendation: The integra-
tion layer should prevent the SPI clock
delay value from changing during a
data transfer
2 Asset SPI Interface Controller
Access point TX FIFO (TX FIFO CONTROL REG)
Threat During step#5 of the write operation,
force the TX FIFO to be clear by setting
TX FIFO CONTROL REG=1
Concern Clearing the TX FIFO could cause data
corruption on some SD cards
Mitigation None. Recommendation: The inte-
gration layer should disable the
TX FIFO CONTROL REG register
during a data transfer
3 Asset SPI Interface Controller
Access point TX FIFO (TX FIFO DATA REG)
Threat Before step#4 of the write operation,
overflow the 512 byte buffer
Concern Overflowing the FIFO buffer will cause
the buffer to hold invalid data
Mitigation None. Recommendation: The integra-
tion layer should validate the size of
the data before inserting it into the con-
troller
Fig. 7 VGA/LCD controller4
the expected behavior of the IP. However, there are two
behaviors that an integrating product may want to prevent.
Both can be easily mitigated at the integration layer.
4.2 SPI Master Controller
Figure 6 shows the block diagram of the SPI Master
Controller IP [15]. A WISHBONE interface exposes con-
figuration, status, and data registers. Since the SPI bus is
serial, there is a 512 byte buffer used by the SPI Interface
Controller component to serialize data.
There are three basic modes of operation: (1) SD card
initialization, (2) SD read, and (3) SD write. The first two
modes are fairly benign and not of interest. The write oper-
ation, however, has behavior that could be of concern. The
basic operational flow for this mode is as follows:
1. Write 512 bytes into TX DATA REG
2. Set the SD block address
3. Set the mode to SPI WRITE BLOCK for a write oper-
ation
4. Start the transaction: SPI START
5. Wait for transaction to complete: STATUS != BUSY
6. Check for any errors: STATUS = WRITE NO ERROR
4.2.1 SPI Master Controller—Threat Model
The functional purpose of this controller is to provide a SPI
interface on the WISHBONE bus. For writes, it takes byte
data from the internal buffer and serializes it onto the SPI
data bus. The SPI Interface Controller component performs
this task and is therefore the asset of the IP. The system
clock used to drive the IP logic is also essential for proper
4http://opencores.org/websvn,filedetails?repname=vga lcd&path=%2
Fvga lcd%2Ftags%2Frel 19%2Fdoc%2Fvga core.pdf
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operation. However, since this is external to the IP, it is a
dependency rather than an asset. Access to the SPI Inter-
face Controller component is provided by the WISHBONE
interface. Table 9 is a threat model for the IP. The identified
threats are mainly caused by performing incorrect opera-
tions during a data transfer. An integrator should consider
mitigating these operations since they can be harmful in a
product.
4.3 VGA/LCD Controller
Figure 7 shows the block diagram of the VGA/LCD Con-
troller IP [16]. There are two WISHBONE interfaces: (1) a
slave interface for the Host to configure and read status of
the IP and (2) a master interface that pulls video data from
external memory. On the opposite side, there are two line
feeds to control either a CRT or LCDmonitor. After the tim-
ings and modes are configured, the Host will set the starting
address where the video data resides in external memory and
enable the controller. Once enabled, the IP will start reading
video data and outputting it to the appropriate channel.
4.3.1 VGA/LCD Controller—Threat Model
The functional purpose of this IP is to provide a VGA/LCD
controller on a WISHBONE interface. Once the controller
is configured, the Timing Generator or Line FIFO com-
ponent, (depending on which is enabled) and the Memory
Puller component, which is not shown in Fig. 7, are respon-
sible for outputting the video data to the correct display.
Without these components, the controller would not be able
to function correctly. Therefore, these three blocks are the
assets of the IP. To access these assets, the WISHBONE
interfaces are used. Additionally, the pixel clock input into
Table 10 Threat model for VGA/LCD controller
# Attribute Definition
1 Asset Memory Puller
Access point Slave WISHBONE (video and cursor base
address registers (BAR))
Threat Setting the BARs allows the IP to read any
external memory address
Concern An attacker can attach a VGA/LCD-
memory converter on the output signals and
use the IP to scrape memory by setting the
BARs to any memory address
Mitigation None. Recommendations:
• Put access controls on the BARs restrict-
ing it to only trusted components
• Provide memory isolation controls on
the IP restricting it from sensitive memory
ranges
the Timing Generator is considered part of the attack sur-
face. Table 10 lists the threat model for the IP. The only true
concern is that this controller can be used to scrape memory.
If not restricted, the controller can be configured to read any
memory address on the master WISHBONE bus. Therefore,
if the product has any sensitive data or secrets in memory,
this IP could be used to extract them.
5 Conclusion
The process and methodology defined in this paper adds
to the security assurance story for multi-sourced systems
by providing a means for trusted IP vendors to provide
an industry defined set of security assurance collateral to
semiconductor providers who are integrating their cores.
Both the SRA and IP threat modeling exercise can be used
to identify and address integration security concerns that
may be overlooked by other techniques such as formal
verification. By examining the functional assets of an IP,
unwanted behaviors can be identified and properly miti-
gated, either within the IP itself or when integrated into a
product. As shown in the examples, the unwanted behav-
iors are often not a result of faulty architecture or design
but rather improper use cases. Once identified and properly
documented, Integrators can take the necessary steps to pre-
vent these behaviors from occurring in their product, thus
improving the overall quality. Additionally, the process can
be used by Integrators to assess the competence of an IP
vendor for establishing and/or increasing trust. Overall, with
minimal investment, this process and methodology can yield
higher quality products which benefit both IP provider and
Integrator.
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Appendix A: Security Risk Assessment Questions
This section details the contents of the SRA mentioned in
Section 3.1. Each figure consists of at least one top-level
question and a path flow that is answer dependent. Addition-
ally, each question has a security concern associated with it
and may contain an action and/or recommendation to take.
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Fig. 8 Debug registers
In the figures, questions are marked with a Q. The secu-
rity concern associated with a question is marked with a
C. The action that needs to be taken by the IP vendor is
marked with an A. The recommendation to address the con-
cern is provided to the Integrator and is marked with an R.
The top-level questions are independent and can be
answered in any order. The answers and comments should
be documented in a similar format as in Tables 3 and 6.
Fig. 9 Test modes
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Fig. 10 Fuse and straps
Fig. 11 Save and restore
J Hardw Syst Secur
Fig. 12 Random numbers
Fig. 13 Integrity checking
Fig. 14 Cryptography
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Fig. 15 Access protections
Fig. 16 Duplicate registers
Fig. 17 External memory
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Fig. 18 Address decoding
Fig. 19 Microcontroller (ROM)
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Fig. 20 Microcontroller (Firmware)
Fig. 21 Non-standard signals
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Fig. 22 Miscellaneous
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